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the

Proceedings

This is

second

of a case involving

judgment denying

real

property an award of damages against the seller and awarding the buyer a judgment against a
title company that prepared an inaccurate legal description of the real property." Cwnmings v.
S'teplzens, et. al., 157 Idaho 348, 351, 336

281,284(201

("Cwnmings T'). After trial the

seller Steven Cummings ("Cummings") appealed and the title company Northern Title Company
of Idaho, Inc. ("Northern Title") cross-appealed. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of
Judgrnent against the seller ("Roger Stephens"), and reversed Cummings' Judgment against
Northern Title. See Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 336 P.3d 281.
On remittitur, Northern Title renewed its pre-appeal motion for costs and
court found and Cummings

The

not dispute that Northern Title is the

party,

Cummings is not a prevailing party, and Roger Stephens is still a prevailing party. Upon
determining each party's prevailing party status, the district court awarded Northern Title its preappeal costs and

Pursuant to Rule 60(b), Northern Title then moved and the district court

vacated Cummings' Judgment and prior award of costs and fees.

1.

The District Court Awarded Cummings with One Judgment.

At trial, Cummings alleged that Roger Stephens and Northern Title filed a correction
deed, and thereby "breached the warranties of title in the Original Deed, converted the 83 acres
lying east of the highway, and slandered Mr. Cummings' title to the real property." See
Curnmings I, 157 Idaho at 353, 336 P.3d at 286. Moreover as to Northern Title, Cummings
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it

escrow
or

title insurance." Id. Cummings

pined that "Stephens and Northern Title

him

emotional distress." Id.
At the

of Cummings' case in chief, Roger Stephens (the seller) moved for

dismissal. Cummings

not elected to call Roger

as a

nor had

Cummings called any of the realtors. See Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 356, 336 P.3d at 289.
Instead, "Cummings only offered the testimony of the manager of Northern Title ... [who J
testified that Mr. Stephens did not participate in the modification ... [i]n fact, there was no
evidence

he was even

when those changes were made or knevv that they were to be

"Id. at 157 Idaho at 355-356, 336 P.3d at 288-289. The district court granted the request,

dismissing Roger Stephens.
to Northern Title, trial continued and

district court later issued its forty-eight (48)

decision. The district court found one judgment against Northern Title, based solely on one
source of liability.

judgment did not

Northern Title's actions as a title

insurance agent. 1 Nor did the judgment implicate Northern Title as the escrow agent.2 Instead,

l Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. ("Northern Title did not act negligently in

performing any action insofar as it relates to its business as an insurance agent").
2 The district court was incensed that Northern Title was an escrow agent and yet had
unilaterally filed a corrective deed that excluded the property east of Highway 30. The district
court went so far as to describe the conduct as willful misconduct, or gross negligence. See
Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 368-369, 336 P.3d at 301-302. (J. Jones, dissenting). But the effect
was nil. The correction had excluded property east of Highway 30, and the district court found
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court

to

s

q
c,

relied.

,ms willing to
an additional $50,000 . . . order to purchase
was the entire Stephens
situated on both sides of the
highway. This
came based upon the negligent
of the legal
description by Northern Title that identified land on the east side of the
highway. The only harm that the Court can conclude that is outside the
of speculation is that
has
proximately harmed by this
negligence in an amount of $50,000.
Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 365, 336 P.3d at 298. (quoting district court). 3,4

2.

The Court Denied Cummings' Appeal.

Cummings appealed, asserting that the district court erred by (1) involuntarily dismissing
Roger Stephens; (2) holding Roger Stephens as a prevailing party; (3) not upholding the original
(4) not quieting Cummings' title to the eastern property; (5) not recognizing a tort of bad

faith; (6)

Cummings'

(7) not awarding Cummings with additional damages;

and (8) not awarding Cummings with punitive damages. See Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 336
P.3d 281.
(and Cummings never disputed) that "[1] the rerecorded deed that excluded property on the east
side of Highway 30 is not a false statement ... [2] the property on the east side of the highway
was never intended to be sold by Stephens ... [3] the real estate deal did not include property
east of the Highway ... [4] Cummings has no right to recover any property, value, or interest
for the Stephens' property located on the east side of the highway." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at
362, 336 P.3d at 295. In addition, "Cummings did not provide any evidence regarding the value
of the property on the east side of the highway." Id.
3 Emphasis and ellipses added.
4 The same can be found in Cummings I, R. Vol 8, p. 1627; see also Larson v. State, 435 P.2d
248, 249, 91 Idaho 908, 909 (1967). (Court can take judicial notice of prior appeal record).
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court

to

an

on

was no

evidence that Mr. Stephens altered the deed"; thus "Cummings has not shown that the district
court abused its discretion in finding that Mr. Stephens was the prevailing party regarding the
claims brought against him." Cummings I, 157

at 353-360, 336 P.3d at 286-293. As to the

district court's purported failure to recognize the original (non-corrected) deed and to quiet
Cummings' title to the eastern property, "Cummings did not assert any claim for quiet title ...
[and] failed to prove that the transaction between him and Mr. Stephens included the sale of the
property on the east side of the highway." Id. at 157 Idaho at 357, 336 P.3d at 290. In other
words, Cummings had failed to assert, let alone prove such claims.
More particularly as to Northern Title, the Court found that the existence of a "tort of bad
faith" against Northern Title as the escrow was irrelevant. The district court had expressly
found, and Cummings did not dispute that Northern Title "acted in good faith," and reasonably
denied

claim; the only information Northern Title had received was

"Cummings only

received property on the west side of Highway 30 ... [i]t was testified extensively at trial that
Northern Title's understanding was that only the property on the \vest side was involved in the
transaction." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 359, 336 P.3d at 292. Based on

district court's

uncontested findings, there had been no bad faith. 5

5 See also fn. 2, supra, regarding Cummings' failure to prove his breach of contract claim
against Northern Title as escrow.
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was
\\'ith

eastern property.

to

Cummings did not dispute his

to that eastern property:

property on the east side of the highway was never intended to be sold ...
Cummings was therefore never entitled to receive this property ... was never the true
owner of the property ... has no claim over that property, value of that property, or any
interest generated from that property the form of CRP payments or otherwise ... [and]
did not provide any
regarding the value of the property ....
Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 362-363, 336 P.3d at 295-296. (quoting district court).
Cummings' last but no less futile arguments were that the district court erred in (I)
excluding his valuation expert, and (2) punitive damages. Here again, however, Cummings
failed to appreciate the circumstances. Cummings had vehemently argued for and gained the
exclusion of Northern Tile's valuation expert, being disclosed two (2) months late. In contrast,
"Cummings was more dilatory ..

uv•~u~,.,,.,

his disclosure was about three months late ... [and]

the district court clearly set forth what it required ... [and warned that] witnesses not disclosed .
. . will be excluded at trial." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 360, 336 P.3d at 293. Therefore, the
exclusion was proper. Id. at 157 Idaho at 361, 336 P.3d at 294. As to punitive damages, the
district court before trial denied Cummings' request to amend, and though such was done
"without prejudice, Cummings did not renew his motion at trial "nor did he ever renew it."
Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 364, 336 P.3d at 297. The, punitive damages were waived.

3.

The Court Reversed Cummings' Judgment.

As to the only source from which harm could be identified, the district court found that
Northern Title was an "abstractor," liable for negligently drafting a deed description:
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on
legal
negligent preparation of
identified land on the east side of the highway.
that the Court can conclude that is outside the realm of speculation is that
Cummings has been proximately harmed by this negligence in an amount of
$50,000.

Cummings/, 157 Idaho at 365, 336 P.3d at 298. (quoting district court, emphasis added).
of

, the "legal description created by Northern Title [\Vas] in the

performing the title work to be done in order to issue a commitment for title insurance." "There
[was] no evidence that Northern Title assumed the duty of being an abstractor

title."

Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 366-367, 336 P.3d at 299-300. Because Northern Title had no duty as
an abstractor, the district court's finding of negligence was error. Id. at 157 Idaho at 367, 336
P.3d at 300. Therefore, the Court reversed Cummings' one and only judgment. Jc/.

Concise Statement qf'Facts
On November 5, 2014, the
"forthwith

with

Northern Title rene\ved

remitted this matter and ordered the district court to

directive of the Opinion, if any action is required."
motion

held "there's no way I can hold

costs and fees, and on January

Vol. 1, p. 21.

2015 the district court

plaintiff as a prevailing party, and I find that Northern

Title prevailed .... " Tr., 32:15-18. (emphasis added). Later that same day the district court
entered its Minute Entry & Order, holding that "Defendant Northern Title is the prevailing
party" and awarding Northern Title its pre-appeal costs and fees. R., Vol. 1, p. 61.
On January 6, 2015, the district court filed its Amended Final Judgment on Costs and

Fees as Between Cummings and Northem Title. R. Vol. 1, pp. 63-64. However, the judgment

RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 6

same amount
at pp.

costs

id. at p. 61 (Northern Title

8, 2015 the district court entered its

as
to $1

to

.62).

on

Amended Final Judgment on Costs and Fees as

Between Cummings and 1'/orthem Title. Id. at pp. 65-66.

Unfortunately, the record was still incomplete. The Court (on appeal) had awarded
Northern Title its costs and

see R., Vol. 1, pp. 29-30 ($25,829.68), which the district court

failed to include. Therefore on January 27, 2015, the district court entered its Third Amended
Final Judgment on Costs and Fees as Bet,veen Northern Title, adding Northern Title's costs and

on appeal. Id. at pp. 67-68. (bringing total cost and fees to $162,363.30).
Northern Title then learned that Cummings' old $50,000 Judgment, and his judgment for
costs and fees, were still both on record with the Bear Lake County of Idaho. Further, opposing
refused to remove them. On February 5, 2015, and pursuant to Rule 60(b) of

Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure, Northern Title requested the district court to vacate Cummings'
$50,000 Judgment (as ordered by this Court) and his prior costs and fees. (as ordered by the
district court).

R., Vol. 1, pp. 69-70. Cummings objected, arguing that despite this Court's

order to reverse his $50,000 Judgment and despite the district court's subsequent orders,
Northern Title was too late and its motion was "baseless." Id. at p. 73. The district court
disagreed and vacated the judgments. Id. at 76-77.
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1.

of Cummings' Judgment the

court

jurisdiction to determine prevailing party status, costs, and attorneys fees?

Cummings' judgment was reversed, Northern Title and not Cummings was the prevailing party:

It just seems to me like I don't have much choice here but to go this way. And I'm
not saying I wouldn't got this way if it was discretionary. It is discretionary. 1 am
exercising my discretion ... where after the Supreme Court's decision that said
that it was wrong of me to award 50,000 to the plaintiff, there's no way I can hold
plaintiff as a prevailing party, and I find that Northern Title prevailed and
order the cost and fees as I've outlined below.
Tr., Vol. 1, 32:10-18.
Whether the district court had jurisdiction is a question of law, over which this Court
exercises free review. See Downey Chiropractic Clinic, 127 Idaho 283,285,900 P.2d 191, 193
(1995).
2.

Whether Cummings has adequately raised that the district court abused its

discretion in granting Northern

s request for Rule 60(b) relief; and if so, whether the district

court in fact abused its discretion and whether any such abuse was harmless?

Standard of Review: Cummings raises this issue only in passing.

Appellant's

Brief at 9-10. To even consider an issue for review, assignments of error must be asserted with
particularity and supported by sufficient authority; a general attack will not do. See Bach v.
Bagley, 148 Idaho 784,790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010).
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15,

court

was
it is no
given

1, p
an abuse

discretion standard:

to
to I.R.C.P.
1s
The
upheld if it appears that the
the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within
and

1058, I

the error is

not

, 151

I IJ
rights

are instructed to

error

not

261

the

a party").

Costs on appeal are awarded as a matter

right. See I.AR. 40. Attorneys fees on appeal

are awarded if authorized by statute, contract, or rule. See Capps

1·.

FIA Card Services, NA., 149

Idaho 797, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590(2010) (citations omitted); see also I.AR. 41.
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)
Appellant's

an award

18.

attorney

to

prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." Clzave::, v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d
1036, 1049 (2008). Should Northern Title prevail on appeal, the Court pursuant to I.AR.
and LC. § I

1

120(3) should award Northern Title its costs as a matter of right and its attorneys

incurred in litigating a commercial transaction.
Alternatively, Cummings' appeal is without merit, and therefore pursuant to LC. § 12123, Northern Title is entitled to attorneys fees on appeal.

ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT

JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
ATTORNEYS FEES, AND COSTS.

PREVAILING

Cummings raises only one standard of review
Cummings argues that the district court did not
correct the prevailing party status,

"free review." Appellant's Brief, 9.

post-appeal jurisdiction to determine and
On appeal, Cummings does not contest any of

the district court's particular findings or conclusions. Most notably, (1) Cummings is not a
prevailing party; (2) Northern Title is the prevailing party; and (3) Northern Title is entitled to
pre-appeal costs and fees of $136,533.62.

A.

On reversal qf Curmnings' Judgment, the district court had postappeal jurisdiction to correct its orders, including those regarding
prevailing party status, attorneys fees, and costs.

Ordinarily, the district court determines prevailing party status, costs and fees shortly
after trial:
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or
the action in relation to the relief sought . . . the extent to which each party
prevailed ... and upon so finding
apportion the costs betrveen and among the
parties in a fair
equitable manner .... "
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). (emphasi and ellipses added). The application of Rule 54, hov;ever, can
be extended. For instance "[a]fter a general reversal, a trial court is free to correct any error in its
original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the appellate court." Hutchins v.

State, 100 Idaho 661, 666, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979).
Obviously, the reversal of a judgment, especially the only judgment, can strongly impact
a district court's prior determination of prevailing party status, costs, and

Therefore, it is

well established that upon reversal the district court is empowered "to make a determination of
what party was the prevailing party and whether the prevailing party was entitled to attorney

"Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nortlnvest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 413-474, 36 P.3d
218,

(2001).
Here, the district court clearly had post-appeal jurisdiction to determine prevailing party

status, costs, and

and make any corrections necessary to its prior orders. By vvay of trial,

Cummings had obtained one Judgment, and on appeal the Court reversed that Judgment. See

Cummings I, 157 Idaho 348, 336 P.3d at 330. Therefore, the district court on remittitur had
jurisdiction to reassess and make any corrections necessary in relationship to prevailing party
status, costs, and fees. See Great Plains Equip. Inc., 136 Idaho at 413-474, 36 P.3d at 225-226.
Cummings, however, argues that prevailing party status, costs and fees were not issues
subsidiary to this Court's reversal. See Appellant's Brief; 9-17. In making his argument,
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on
court

V.

11

, 132

no authority to enter any

or

not in

(1

with the

order of the appellate court." Id. at 132 Idaho at 833, 979 P.2d at 1191. Under this rule, the
Court vvent on to hold that the district court's post-appeal jurisdiction did not include pre-appeal
costs and fees; it was limited to the "ministerial act" of entering judgment as directed. Id.
However, this case and Hummer are clearly distinguishable. Namely in Hummer, the
Court did not reverse a judgment. Rather as stated in Hummer I, 129 Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981
( 1996), the Court vacated an additur of damages. Id. Thus in Hummer II, "the issue of attorney
fees was not a subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein." Hummer II, 132 Idaho at 832-833, 979
P.2d at 1190-1191. In stark contrast here, the Court

Cummings I affirmed the district court's

dismissal of Roger Stephens, and express! y held:
We reverse the judgment against Northern Title ... his judgment against Northern
Title must be reversed .... [and again] we reverse Mr. Cummings's judgment
against Northern Title.

Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. 6 Therefore, unlike Hummer this case involves
the reversal of Cummings' one and only Judgment, leaving the district court

to correct any

error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the appellate court."

Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000.
In addition to logic, the district court's jurisdiction is supported by Rule 54 which leaves
the determination of prevailing party status, costs and fees to the "trial court." I.R.C.P. 54(1 )(B).
Notwithstanding, Cummings tenuously interprets Hummer to stand for the proposition that even

6 Brackets and ellipses added.
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a

s

not

court expressly changes
cost

costs
or vacates a

prevailing

VoL 1, p. 55; see also Appellant's Brief, 10-11, 16.
support, Cummings cites to

(3) cases and none

them support his proposition.

instance in J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics International, Inc., 126 Idaho 532, 887 P.2d 1039

(I

on first appeal vvas requested and declined to

prevailing party status.

Id. at 259. On second appeal, the Court held:

[W]hen this Court reversed the jury verdict ... relieving Chemetics of liability, the
question of attorney fees was a "subsidiary issue fairly comprised therein." On
remand the district court had the jurisdiction to consider whether Chemetics
,vas the prevailing party and to make an award of costs and attorney fees.
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Intern., Inc., (U.S. Inc.), 939 P.2d 574, 577, 130 Idaho 255, 258

(Idaho 997). 7 Similarly here, the district court had denied "all of Cummings's claims against
336 P.3d at 286. (emphasis added).
Because that one successful claim was founded on an erroneous theory of abstractor liability, the
Court reversed. Id. at 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. Therefore like in Chemetics, the district
court had jurisdiction to reconsider pre-appeal costs and fees, and correct orders as necessary.
What Cummings fails to appreciate is that the district court's post-appeal jurisdiction is
found as a result of the reversal, not as a result of an appellate court's decision to pass on or
decide issues relating to prevailing party status, costs, or fees. For instance, in Great Plains

Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corporation, 132 Idaho 754, 771, 979 P.2d 624, 644

7 (emphasis, brackets, and ellipses added).
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statute no

(1

of

, the

the prior

passed on

issue of prevailing party. On subsequent appeal, the Court agreed that because of the reversal the
district court
and whether
Inc., 136 Idaho at 41

was

" Great Plains Equip.,

was

36 P.3d at 225-226. (emphasis added).

In contrast here, while the Court found that Northern Title was not an abstractor, and thus
Cummings' one and only Judgment could not stand. Such did not, ipsofacto, dictate the
appropriateness of trial fees awarded under Idaho Code § l
was still a commercial transaction, justifying an

120(3). The underlying transaction

of

See Cummings I, 157 Idaho at

368, 336 P.3d at 300. Furthermore, the reversal did not ipso facto dictate that Cummings was
100% no longer a prevailing party. As Justice Jones argued in his dissent, the Court did not
overturn the district court's finding that Northern Title's actions constituted negligence, gross
negligence, or willful misconduct in relationship to the escrow agreement.

Cummings I, 157

Idaho at 368-369, 336 P.3d at 301-302. (J. Jones, dissenting). 8
Simply put, upon reversal of a judgment

district court's post-appeal jurisdiction to

consider costs and fees is not lessened by the fact that the determination will require some
discretion. For instance

Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Go(f Club at Black Rock, LLC, 155

Idaho 604, 315 P.3d 792 (Idaho 2013), the Court reversed the judgment but also the award of

8 But see also fn. 2, supra. (regarding district court's ample reasoning of why such conduct could
not amount to a judgment).
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\Vere

the

was not

to

Id. 9

the district court

jurisdiction to address costs and
of the reversal,

contract

and on subsequent appeal the Court pointed out (again) that

district court had jurisdiction to

pre-appeal costs and fees.

See Sky Canyon Properties, LLC v. Golv Club at Black Rock, LLC, 44216 (Sept. 30, 2015). The
was so

in fact that the Court ordered a new judge to be appointed, and Justice

Eismann's concurring opinion at the first bold header stated "[t]he District Court Had Post-

Appeal Jurisdiction to Determine the Prevailing Party and Award Costs." /d. 10
Here, the district court did just that and Cummings does not dispute its findings:
It just seems to me like I don't have much choice here but to go this way. And
I'm not saying I wouldn't got this way if it was discretionary. It is discretionary.
I am exercising my discretion ... where after the Supreme Court's decision that
said that it was wrong of me to award 50,000 to the plaintiff, there's no \Vay I can
hold the plaintiff as a prevailing party, and I find that Northern Title prevailed and
order the cost
fees as I've outlined below.

Tr., Vol. I, 32:10-18.
Cummings' argument that the district court lacked jurisdiction is without merit. The
Court reversed Cummings' one and only judgment and the district court therefore had
jurisdiction to determine and correct any orders regarding prevailing party status, costs and fees.

9 Notably, at that first appeal the Court did not address pre-appeal prevailing party status, nor the
amount of costs or fees. Id.
l O Emphasis in original.
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Cummings I, Northern

court

argued that if it prevailed on

, the Court did not

should be ordered to make Northern Title the prevailing party.

address the issue in its Opinion, holding "[b ]ecause the remaining issues raised by Northern Title
in its cross-appeal sought to reverse the award of damages

other reasons, we need not address

those issues." Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. After the Court issued its
Opinion, Northern Title petitioned for a rehearing requesting the

to address Northern

Title's pre-appeal prevailing party status, costs and attorneys fees. See R., Vol. 1, 6-14. Without
comment, the Court denied the request.

Order Re Additions to Clerk's

Filed in

District Court (Aug. 27, 2015). (taking judicial notice of the order). Cummings argues that by

denying Northern Title's petition for rehearing, the Court decided the issue on the merits.
Appellant's Brief, 11.

Obviously, the Court's order denying Northern Title's request for a rehearing was not a
decision on the merits. As Rule 54 to the Idaho Rules of Civil
party status and the award of costs and

rests

clear, prevailing

the sound discretion of the trial court. See

I.R.C.P. 54(l)(B). Furthermore, "[a]fter a general reversal, a trial court is free to correct
error in its original findings and conclusions as to matters not passed on by the appellate court."
Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000.

In this case, Counsel for Cummings admitted on remittitur that Cwnmings I was silent as
to pre-appeal prevailing party status, costs, and fees:

RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 16

COURT:

How? Couldn't it just as likely be the Supreme Court saying, "We're not
going to even address this
our prior opinions in other cases make
this
clear?"

OLSEN:

Well, I think, your Honor, it's important to remember, too, that Northern
Title filed a cross-appeal on all of those issues.

COURT:

I understand that.

OLSEN:

And they did not - that appeal was not granted.

COURT:

Was it even addressed though?

OLSEN:

Well, I would say, your Honor, that -

COURT:

Show me in the opinion where it said anything about that. I didn't find it.

OLSEN:

Well, in the opinion, your Honor, it does indicate in the procedural history
part of it that,
they did appeal that

COURT:

But where did the Supreme Court address that issue?

OLSEN:

And that I can't say. It doesn't specifically address it, other than that
it denied their petition for rehearing.

COURT:

And I agree. They clearly denied the petition for rehearing, but I
think it's saying a lot to interpret why they denied it.

OLSEN:

Right.

Tr., Vol. 1, 4:21-5:25. 11 The Court's silence was just that- silence. A discretionary matter was
left to the district court, the district court exercised its discretion and Cummings does not dispute

11 Emphasis added.
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(1)

not a

lS

of $136,533.62.

costs

lS

The Court should deny Cummings' appeal. The Court's Opinion reversed Cummings'
one and only Judgment, was silent as to pre-appeal prevailing party status, costs, and
thus the district court properly exercised its post-appeal jurisdiction.

and

LR.C.P. 54.

Upon remittitur, the district court's jurisdiction was limited to subsidiary
issues not passed on but fairly comprised within the Court's Opinion.
A district court does not "have
Remittitur allowed the district
action is

,,,

to comply with 'the directive of the Opinion, if

, 979 P.2d at 1191, 132 Idaho at 833.

and conclusions as to matters not passed on
at 576-577.

even in the event

to correct any error in its

of a general reversal, the district court is still only

Idaho at 257-258, 939

the case simply

discretionary

to

appellate court." Chemetics, 130

Hutchins, l 00 Idaho at 666, 603

at 1000))

(emphasis added).
Cummings'

court

seek out a

lS

without merit.
Cummings' claims against Northern Title "except one." See Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 353, 336
P.3d at 286. 12 That one successful claim was "[t]he

that the district court could

identify, and it was reversed. ld. 13 On appeal, Cummings did not contest the district court's

12 Emphasis added.
13 Emphasis added.
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was
never intended to sell, and

no

as an

14

did not include the eastern property;

Cummings had zero entitlement to the eastern property; or that Cummings failed to provide any
of

value. 15

did Cummings dispute that Northern Title

. goo d ,mt
-F • h 16
m
.

Thus, the time for Cummings to address and seek out a "correct theory" \Vas at trial or at
on his first appeal, not nmv

Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 117, 878

813,816

(Idaho App. 1994). (holding Rule 60(b) is not a substitute for timely appeal). Cummings
nonetheless pines that if the district court has jurisdiction to consider pre-appeal costs and fees, it
should "have been afforded ... consideration of a reinstatement of damages based on a correct
theory[.]" Appellant's Brief; l 7-18. For at least three (3) reasons, Cummings' argument fails.
First, the district court's post-appeal jurisdiction was limited to correcting its original
findings and conclusions, i.e.

conflict with this Court's decision. See Chemetics, 130 Idaho

at 257-258, 939 P.2d at 576-577. On his first appeal, Cummings challenged the district court's
( 1) dismissal of Roger Stephens; (2) purported failure to uphold the original deed; (3) purported
failure to quiet title; (4) decision that Roger Stephens was a prevailing party; (5) refusal to
recognize a tort of bad faith; (6) exclusion of Cummings' expert at trial; (7) purported failure to
award Cummings with additional damages; and (8) purported failure to award punitive damages.

14 See Curnmings I, 157 Idaho at 367,336 P.3d at 300.
15 Id.

16 ld.
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I.

no error. 17

error,
court

not

as to

was

111

no need for a correction of those denials. Further, where there was no need for correction there
\Vas no post-appeal jurisdiction. See Chemetics, 130 Idaho at 257-258, 939 P.2d at 576-577.
Second, even if a "correct theory" existed, Cummings does not raise it.

Clear

5'prings Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,812,252 P.3d 71, 93 (2011). ("this Court will

not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal"). Below, Cummings never moved the
district court to consider alternative theories of relief. Instead, he vaguely asserted that "[i]f the
proceedings are re-opened,

would then prevent Cummings from seeking a reinstatement of

damages based upon some other theory than abstractor of title?" R., Vol. 1, 55. What that "other
theory" might be Cummings did not say. Similarly on appeal, Cummings vaguely asserts that "a
reinstatement of damages based on a correct theory would not be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's Opinion." Appellant's Brief; 18. Again, Cummings does not even suggest a "correct

17 Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 353-367, 336 P.3d at 286-300. (holding district court sufficiently
addressed reasons for dismissing Stephens, and evidence "was sufficient for the district court to
find that Mr. Cummings has failed to prove his claims against Stephens"; "[t]he district court
did not make any ruling regarding the validity of the Original Deed"; Cummings waived claim to
real property during trial, did not dispute the finding that he was not entitled to the property, and
"did not assert any claim for quit title ... or to void the Corrective Deed"; "Cummings has not
shown that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Mr. Stephens was the prevailing
party"; Cummings failed to prove bad faith where he failed to challenge any of the district
court's findings; "in excluding Mr. Cummings's expert witness ... the district court acted in a
manner that was consistent with the applicable legal standards"; "district court did not err in
failing to award him additional damages; Cummings "waived any claim" for punitive damages;
"he has not prevailed on appeal")
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to

it.
Third, Cummings' suggestions are inconsistent \vith this Court's Opinion. Under the
"right result - wrong theory rule," if the "lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous
theory, this Court will affirm the order on the correct theory." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v.
Mussell, 139 Idaho 28,

72 P.3d 868, 873 (Idaho 2003). (citation omitted); see

Idaho ~"1"clz.

for Equal Ed. Opp. v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573,580, 850 P.2d 724, 731 (1993). In fact, "[t]his

Court must uphold the finding and judgment of the trial court if it is capable of being upheld on
any theory." Berry v. Koehler, 86 Idaho 225, 233, 384 P.2d 484, 489 (1963). In Cummings I, the
Court did not uphold the district court's judgment on an alternative theory

because it could not.

In fact, the Court expressly ordered that the "judgment against Northern Title must be reversed."
Id. at! 57 Idaho at 367, 336 P.3d at 300. (emphasis added). The suggestion, therefore, that the

district court should have jurisdiction to rummage for alternative theories to keep Cummings'
Judgment alive is not "a subsidiary issue fairly comprised" within the Court's Opinion. Hummer,
Idaho at 832-833, 979 P.2d at 1190-1191.
The Court should deny Cummings' appeal. The district court was ordered to reverse
Cummings' Judgment, and his vague suggestion that the district court had post-appeal
jurisdiction to rummage for an "other theory" is without merit.
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argues that the district court did not have post-appeal jurisdiction to entertain
Rule 60(b) relief. Importantly, Cummings does not contest any of the district court's findings or
conclusions. Most notably, (1) Cummings' $50,000 Judgment and judgment of costs and fees
for $112,448.09 are void, and (2) the prospective application of these judgments would be
inequitable. See R., Vol. 1, p 77. Instead, Cummings' sole argument is that pre-appeal costs and
fees were not an issue fairly subsidiary to this Court's reversal, and thus the district court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain a request for Rule 60(b) relief.

Appellant's Brief; 10-14.

Northern Title's response to Cummings' jurisdictional argument is contained supra.
Therefore, Northern Title limits the following to those arguments Cummings made in passing, as
contained

A.

Appellants' Brief; pp. 9-10.

Curmnings raises this issue only in passing and
give credence to his ernpty argument.
the Court to

an

on

the appellant's

Court should not

contain,

argument section, the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal,
the reasons therefor, with the citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and
record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
Cummings does not adequately assign an error against the district court for granting
Northern Title's request for Rule 60(b) relief. First, Cummings does not raise the applicable
standard of review, and does not dispute the district court's findings. Cummings never argues an
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to overturn a
's

for review).

' 1

at

s

192 P.3d at 1061

(stating

Cummings dispute that his costs and fees were rendered void and

became inequitable upon the district court's subsequent finding that Cummings is not a
prevailing party. See Tr., Vol. I 32: 1 18 (holding Cummings is no longer a prevailing party);
see

R., Vol. 1, p. 61 (holding "Defendant Northern Title is the prevailing party"); see also

Id. at p. 77. ("void" and inequitable).
Second, Cummings does not make a cognizable argument. For Cummings to raise an
he must at least ( 1) assert assignments of error with particularity and (2) support his
position with sufficient legal or record authority.
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with particularity and
to support his position with sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too
general attack on the findings and
indefinite to be heard by the Court.
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. This Court will not search the record on
appeal for error. Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not
argued and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived.
·
Baclz, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152. (emphasis
added). 18

In only one paragraph, Cummings vaguely alleges that Northern Title's motion lacked

"good cause." Appellant's Brief, 10. Why it lacks good cause Cummings does not say. Further,
Cummings cites to the record only once, nonsensically referencing to the last page of Northern
Title's Rule 60(b) motion and the first page of Cummings' response. Id. at 10. (citing R. Vol. 1,
18 Citing Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975); Michael v. Zehm, 74
Idaho 442,445,263 P.2d 990,993 (1953); Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Pro.fl Discipline, 138 Idaho 397,
400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005)).
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not even

s

to

Vol. 1,
In contrast, this Court has repeatedly held

will not consider assignments of error not

supported by argument and authority in the opening brief." Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559,
130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (Idaho 2006). Cummings is fully aware of this rule. See e.g. Cummings I,
157 Idaho at 362, 336 P.3d at 295. (refusing to address Cummings' unsupported arguments).
(quoting Hogg, 142 Idaho at 559, 130 P.3d at 1097). Where Cummings has failed to provide the
Court (and this Appellant) with the most basic of supported argument, the Court should disregard
Cummings' general, unexplained attack.
The Court should not consider Cummings' bald attack against the district court's Rule
60(b) relief. Cummings fails to cite or address the abuse of discretion standard, does not contest
the district court's findings, and does not point to or support any assignable error with
particularity.

B.

Notwithstanding, the district court's order granting Northern Title's
request.for Rule 60(b) relief supported by the law
the record.
i.

The district court's order granting Northern Title's request
for Rule 60(b) relief was lawful.

Under Rule 60(b)(5),

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure "provides a means of obtaining

relief from a final judgment which is based on a prior judgment that has been reversed, or
otherwise vacated, or if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application." Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436,437, 914 P.2d 933, 934 (1996). (quoting LR.C.P.
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Rule
see also

V.

lS

153 Idaho 157, 163,

P.3cl 1

190

201

(to

void means court "lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter").
First, the district court properly found that Cummings' $50,000 Judgment is void.
Court ordered that the Judgment "must be reversed." Cwnmings I, 157 Idaho at 353, 367, 336
at 286, 300. When this Court orders a

, "[a] trial court

no authority to enter any

judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court." Hummer, 132 Idaho at
979 P.2d at 1191. Therefore, when Northern Title motioned the district court to vacate
Cummings' Judgment, the district court lacked jurisdiction to do anything but vacate the
Judgment. See Peterson, l 53 Idaho at 163, 280 P.3d at 190. Cummings, in contrast, argued that
Northern Title's request was "baseless." R., Vol. 1, p. 73. The district court disagreed, properly
holding that Cummings' Judgment was void. Id. at p. 77. 19
Second, the district court properly vacated Cummings' pre-appeal costs and fees. Due to
the reversal, the district court held "there's no way I can hold the plaintiff as a prevailing party,
and I find that Northern Title prevailed .... " Tr., 32: 15-18. Later that same day in its Minute
Entry & Order, the district court ordered "Defendant Northern Title is the prevailing party." R.,

Vol. 1, p. 61.20 Thus, Rule 60(b )(5) 21 was implicated. A district court may grant relief "from a

19 In addition, the district court correctly relied upon I.R.C.P. 60(b )(5), finding that prospective
application of the reversed Judgement would not be equitable. R., Vol. 1, p. 73. Cummings does
not dispute these findings.
20 Emphasis added.
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1S

on a

or if it is no longer

or

the judgment should

application.

128

Idaho at 437, 914 P.2d at 934. As explained in Curl v. Curl, 115 Idaho 997, 1000, 772 P.2d 204,
207 (1998), Rule 60(b)(5) directly applies when a change to a prior judgment renders a later
judgment, in the same case, inappropriate. Id.
That is what happened here. The Court reversed Cummings' Judgment, which rendered
his subsequent judgment for costs and fees potentially improper. 22 That judgment for costs and
fees became entirely improper when

district court found that Cummings is not a prevailing

party:

It is discretionary. I am exerc1smg
discretion . . . where after the
Supreme Court's decision that said that it was wrong of me to award 50,000
to the plaintiff, there's no way I can hold the plaintiff as a prevailing party,
and I find that
order the cost and fees as
outlined below.

Tr., Vol. 1, 32:10-18. 23 Cummings does not dispute these findings. Therefore, where
Cummings' prior Judgment was

and his prevailing party status was changed, the

21 Even if reliance on Rule 60(b )( 5) was somehow erroneous, Cummings is not a prevailing
party. Therefore, his prior judgment for costs and fees is clearly inequitable. See e.g. I.R.C.P.
60(b)(6).
See Cummings I, R. Vol. 9, pp. 1805. ("[e]ach Count of Cummings' Amended Complaint
sought damages for the failure to get what he bargained for - the property on the east side of the
highway. The Court awarded him $50,000 for that failure. Therefore, Cummings did prove the
gravamen of his case. He is the prevailing party as between Cummings and Northern Title"); see
also R. Vol. 9, p. 1816. (Final Judgment on Costs and Fees, dated Apr. 12, 2013); Cf R. Vol. 8,
p. 1586 (Final Judgment of $50,000, dated Jan. 22, 2013).
23 Emphasis added.
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prospective

of his judgment

costs and fees became inequitable. See I.R.C.P.

60(b)(5). 24
On appeal, the only basis that Cummings argues Rule 60(b) should not apply was
because Northern Title did not show a "mistake of fact." Appellant's Brief, 8. Cummings misses
the mark. He cites to Berg v. Kendall, 212 P.3d 1001, 1006-1007, 147 Idaho 571, 576-577
(Idaho 2009), a case clearly distinguishable

the fact that it involved Rule 60(b)(l), not Rule

60(b)(4) or Rule 60(b)(5). Id. Northern Title's relief was not granted because of a mistake:
[T]here are valid reasons for granting the motion, particularly under subsection
(4) because the two cha11enged judgments are void and subjection (5) because it is
no longer equitable that the judgments should have prospective application given
the subsequent rulings of the Idaho Supreme Court and this Court.
R., Vol. 1, p. 77. 25

24 Cummings does not argue whether his judgment for costs and fees was or was not a
"prospective judgment." See Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 118, 666 P.2d 639, 645 (1983). ("the
crucial issues are whether the judgment has prospective application and whether it is no longer
equitable that it have such application"). However, "any component of the order is a
'prospective judgment,' and can be modified under Rule 60(b)(5), if it is susceptible to the legal
or equitable rights of the parties as they evolve due to changes in law or circumstance." Meyers
v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,290,221 P.3d 81, 88 (Idaho 2009); see also Rudd, 105 Idaho at 119,
666 P.2d at 646. (holding judgment's prospective features, such as being liened, were subject to
Rule 60(b)(5)). Here, the judgment was recorded as a lien. See R. at Vol. 1, p. 76 ("judgments
have been recorded"). Additionally, Cummings' status as a prevailing party was susceptible to
change, as was his award of costs and fees. The district court found that Cummings was not a
prevailing party, Tr., Vol. 1, 32: 10-18. Therefore, the district court's continued application of
Cummings' costs and fees judgment would be inequitable.
25 Even if Rule 60(b) was not the appropriate vehicle, any error was harmless. See I.R.C.P. 61
The district court had ample authority to make the change under I.R.C.P. 54. A "final judgment"
resolves all claims for relief, and that finality is not impacted by costs and fees. I.R.C.P. 54(a).
Obviously then, the di.strict court's award to Northern Title of its pre-appeal costs and fees, see
R., Vol. 1, p. 61 did not add finality to the case. Nor did the case become more "final" upon the
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was

s

by
Judgment void, Cummings' status as a prevailing party changed, making his judgment for costs
and fees inequitable.
ll.

's

Rule 60(b)

was

"Whether a motion under Rule 60(b) is timely is an issue of fact for the district court."

Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595,597,961 P.2d l 198, 1200 (1998).
Northern Title's

for Rule 60(b)

was timely. Cummings argued that

Northern Title was too late because "this matter is completed." R., Vol. 1, p. 73. The district
court aptly reasoned, however, that "IRCP 60(b) is a post-judgment rule designed to be filed and
decided after the case is completed." R., Vol. I, p. 76; see also I.R.C.P. 60(b). In contrast,
Cummings gives no basis for accusing Northern Title of "tardiness."

Appellant's Brief, 10.

First, the district court expressly found that Northern Title's request was timely. See R.,
Vol.1, p. 76 ("[t]he

is not untimely").

district court entered its Amended Final

Judgment on Costs and Fees as Between Cwmnings and Northern Title on January 6, 2015. /d. at

district court's later vacating of Cummings' Judgment. See R., Vol. 1, pp. 76-77. Rather, finality
was fixed on entry of this Court's Opinion. The district court had denied "all of Cummings's
claims against Northern Title except one," Cummings!, 157 Idaho at 353, 336 P.3d at 286,
and the case became final when that one claim was reversed. See Hummer, 132 Idaho at 833, 979
P.2d at 1191. ("the judgment of the appellate court is a final judgment in the cause, and the entry
thereof in the lower court is a purely ministerial act"). Because the district court's award to
Northern Title of its costs and fees did not add finality to the case, the same did not deprive the
district court of its already existent jurisdiction to correct its prior orders of costs and fees.
Where the district court was authorized under l.R.C.P. 54 to vacate Cummings' prior costs and
fees, any error in reliance on post-judgment relief, LR.C.P. 60(b), was harmless.
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court
its Third

some

id. at pp. 65-68,

on

15

and Fees as Between Cummings

Final Judgment on

Northern Title. See R., Vol. l, pp. 67-68. 26 Northern Title's request for Rule 60(b) relief was

thirty (30)

after the

the above judgments, and within nine (9) days

after the last corrective judgment. Id. at 69-70. 27 Therefore, Northern Title was timely.
district court did not err in finding that Northern Title's

for Rule 60(b)

ief

was timely. Rule 60(b) relief is designed for "post-judgment" relief and Northern Title filed its
motion a mere nine (9) days

the final judgment.

26
are obligated to ensure their own subject matter jurisdiction and must raise the issue
sua sponte if necessary," In Re City of Slzelley, 15 l Idaho 289, 295, 255 P.3d 1175, 180 (Idaho
2001 ), even "before all other questions, which includes the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction." Steve v. Wo(le, 343 P.3d 497,502 (2015, Op. No. 18). The district court's award of
Northern Title's costs on appeal was purely "ministerial" in nature. See Hummer, 132 Idaho at
833,979 P.2d at 119 l. Yet in the district court's Third Arnended Judgments as to Fees and
Costs Between Cwmnings and Northern Title, which simply accomplishes the ministerial act of
adding Northern Title's costs and fees on appeal, the district court also revoked and declared that
its prior final judgments relating to Northern Title's pre-appeal costs and fees were null and void.
See R., Vol. I, pp. 67-68. The affect was a baseless toll on Cummings' time to appeal, which
would otherwise be late. See I.AR. 14. Cummings has not assigned error to the district court for
voiding Northern Title's prior judgments for costs and fees, and thus to the extent necessary the
Court would need to address the issue, sua sponte.

27 Cummings also baldly alleges that the district court granted Northern Title's request "without
any opportunity for Cummings to respond to the substance of the motion." Appellant's Brief; 10.
The argument is without merit. Cummings had the opportunity to respond, and did respond by
filing an Objection to Northern Title's Rule 60(b) Motion. See R., Vol. 1, 72. The district court
expressly addressed and denied Cummings' objections. Id. at 76-77.
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Under Idaho Appellate Rules,

on appeal. See

Court has power to award costs and

I.A.R. 40(a); see also id. at 41. As a matter of law, attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing
if authorized by statute, contract, or rule.

Capps, 149 Idaho at

240 P.3d at 590.

(citations omitted).
First, the Court should award Northern Title its fees on appeal because this matter falls
the purview of a commercial

see I.C. § l

120(3), and Cummings admits the

same. See Appellant's Brief; 18. Alternatively, this Court should award Northern Title its costs
and fees on appeal because Cummings' appeal is without merit. See I.C. § 12-123.
As
OLSEN:

by the district court in response to Cummings' arguments below:
So it [Northern Title] presented all of those issues in front of the
Supreme Court in a petition for rehearing, and the Court denied
that petition.
so that in itself is a direction from the Court How? Couldn't it just as likely
the Supreme
saying,
"We're not going to even address this because our prior opinions
other cases make this very dear?"

Tr., Vol. 1, 4:21-5:25. (emphasis added).
Of note

the case of Sky Canyon Properties,

v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, No.

42216 (Sept. 30, 2015), a district court held that despite a reversal it did not have jurisdiction to
consider fees and costs on remittitur, and this Court ordered the Administrative District Judge to
appoint a new judge. Id. Similarly here Cummings has raises arguments regarding clearly
established legal standards that are simply contrary to his position.

RESPONDENT NORTHERN TITLE - 30

Northern

case

its

transaction. Furthermore,
over

IS

argumg

established legal standards.

CONCLUSION
First, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to (l) determine prevailing party status,
costs and fees, and (2) entertain a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate Cummings' judgments. This
Court had reversed Cummings' one and only judgment, and after that reversal, the district court
was empowered to correct its past orders, including the assessment of prevailing party status,
costs and fees. Sec LR.C.P. 54; sec also Hutchins, 100 Idaho at 666, 603 P.2d at 1000. ("[a]fter a
general reversal, a trial court is free to correct any error in its original findings and conclusions as
to matters not passed on by the appellate court").
Second, in Cummings I the Court expressly

that

Judgment "must be

reversed," Cummings I, 157 Idaho at 353,367,336 P.3d at 286, 300, and "[a] trial court has no
authority to enter any judgment or order not in conformity with the order of the appellate court."
Hwnmer, 132 Idaho at 833,979 P.2d at 1191. Therefore, the district court properly disregarded
Cummings' vague request to rummage for an "other theory" for the judgment to stay alive.
Third, because the district court had jurisdiction to correct its orders and enter judgments
therewith, the district court clearly had jurisdiction to entertain Northern Title's request for Rule
60(b) relief. In response, Cummings makes bald, vague accusations that Northern Title "failed
to meet the burden of good cause for relief,'' and that Northern Title was 'tardy.' See Appellant's
Brief 9-10. Nonetheless, there was good cause for reiief. Cummings was no longer a prevailing
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properly relied on Rule 60(b), "a post-judgment rule designed to be filed and decided after the
case is completed." R.,

1, p. 76.

Finally, the Court should award Northern Title its costs and fees on appeal. Costs are
provided as a matter of right, see LA.R. 41, and the underlying case involved a commercial
transaction for which fees are appropriate. See LC.§ 12-120(3). In addition, Cummings' appeal
is without merit, an unnecessary litigation over established standards of law. Id. at § 1 123.
Northern Title respectfully requests that the Court deny Cummings' appeal, and award
Northern Title its costs and fees on appeal.
DATED this

of December, 2015.
BEARNSON & CALDWELL, LLC

arnson
. Bergman
Attorneys for Respondent Northern Title
Company of Idaho, Inc.
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